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Summary
:
This essay reviews the mechanisms by which the Brazilian national "Housing-Finance
System" adjusted the principals of its savings and lending instruments for inflations
since the system was founded in 1964. The history of the adoption by the System of
different "index-linking plans" is recounted. The contradictions and other difficulties
of the various index-linking plans is explained by the inherent difficulty of having
index-linked mortgages in a society in which wages, and indeed most other kinds of
earnings, are not index-linked.'
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Introduction .
In any nation with a private financial market, the market for housing
finance is singularly vulnerable to sustained inflation. The reasons are
clear enough. Mortgages are by nature long-term contracts, but inflation
turns the future real value of the monetary unit uncertain—hopelessly
uncertain where the future is ten or fifteen years, which is the order of
magnitude of a mortgage contract. Consequently, suppliers of finance
capital will prefer to avoid the housing-finance market. So much the
worse, of course, if the interest rates in the housing-finance market
are subjected to unrealistic controls.
This essay describes how Brazil established a housing-finance market
in spite of circumstances of sustained inflation. The principal innova-
tion, we shall see, was the introduction of ex post financial index-
linking on savings instruments of the housing sector—that is, the intro-
duction of savings instruments that guaranteed a certain real , not nominal
return. This seems a sm.sible solution at first. :iigh&, and the idea has
been considered even in nations that have far less serious inflation
problems than Brazil. But in Brazil index-linking created a new problem
that proved rather difficult to resolve: If the savings instruments
were denominated in real terms, then the assets backing them—i.e., the
mortgages—would also have to be denominated in real terms. But under
the circumstances of the late 1960s, what Brazilian household would—or
could—undertake a liability denominated in real terms? In what follows
we recount how the Brazilian authorities found a solution to this prob-
lem. The solution, we will argue, was not entirely satisfactory; it
violated the index-linking principle in some ways, and came very close
in the end to amounting to having nominal mortgages financing index-
linked savings with the help of what were, in effect, government subsidies.
-1-
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The background of Brazil's housing problem .
On March 31, 1964 a military-civilian coup d' etat in Brazil
toppled the vaguely populist, ineffective government of President JoSo
Goulart. The coup was the culmination of a sustained political and
economic crisis which seemed, in the opinion of many observers, to be
leading inexorably toward social chaos, and perhaps communist or fascist
rule. In the view of the military and of a large part of their civi-
lian support, the crisis was the manifestation of fundamental deficiencies
and dissonances in the Brazilian economy and social structure, and these
failings were beyond the capacity of the existing political system to
resolve. The new government, under the widely-respected General Humberto
Castello Branco, wanted time and power to elaborate the policies it
thought were necessary to enable the nation to develop in a secure and
steady way. Consequently, for the first time in Brazilian history, the
armed forces decided to retain power indefinitely, rather than return
the nation to civilian government after a brief transitional period as
they had done on certain earlier occasions. Although the army dominated
the new government, the ministries and the principal government institu-
tions (apart from those concerned with national defense) were placed
under the direction of highly competent civilians, who have since come
to be described as "technocrats". It was hoped that these civilians
could formulate appropriate policies without being subjected to conflict-
ing political pressures.
The principal economic manifestation of the crisis were a severe
acceleration of inflation; a prolonged industrial recession; and a
growing housing shortage. The recession and the housing shortage were
-3-
unquestionably due in large measure to the inflation. Brazil had had
an inflation problem for many years, because rapid industrialization and
the construction of a new capital city had made lavish demands on the
2
nation's resources through the 1950s. In the early 1960s the inflation
accelerated sharply, however: the percentage increases in the general
price index were 30.5 for 196C, 47.7 for 1961, 51.3 for 1962, 81.2 for
3
1963, and an annual rate of 110.0 for the first three months of 1964.
(See Table 1.) The Goulart Administration clearly had no viable program
to control the inflation by 1964: its major stabilization effort, the
Dantas-Furtado Program, had lasted only through the first six months of
41963 and then been abandoned.
At the time of the coup it was clear to most observers that the main
cause of the accelerating inflation was the attempt by the federal government
to seize an increasing rhare of the national income tiirough tin increasing
budget deficit. Once the inflation had turned serious, the government
could no longer sell Treasury obligations to finance the deficit. There
was a usury law in effect, which limited nominal interest rates to twelve
per cent per year. Strictly speaking this was not really the problem,
for the bonds could always havs been sold at a heavy discount. The real
problem was that the rate of inflation finally became so unpredictable
that it was not possible even to guess what rate of discount would have
been appropriate for the bonds. The principal causes of the growth of
the federal deficit were the large wage adjustments granted to government
employees, particularly one heavy increase granted in late 1963, and
heavy subsidies to public enterprises, particularly to those engaged in
-4-
transportation. The deficit was financed by voluminous issues of
currency: in spite of the attempt at stabilization during the early
part of 1963, 84 percent of the government's deficit for the year was
financed by money creation, and the money supply increased by 64 per-
cent over the year.
When the new government assumed power and took stock of the
situation that it had inherited, it quickly concluded that it could
not bring either the deficit or the inflation under control in the
short run. To have done so would have meant either raising taxes
drastically, or else dismissing government employees and suspending
vital national investment programs. These would have been politi-
cally impossible, and at all events the new government did not wish
to deepen the industrial recession any further. The new government
did introduce a more stringent mechanism f^r pre) arirj;, the government
budget, but it accepted the fact that it would have to live with a
high deficit for some time to come. At the same time, however, the
government's economics team, led by the Ministers of Finance and
Planning, Dr. Octavio Gouveia de BulhSes and Dr. Roberto Campos respec-
tively, conceived an imaginative plan to mitigate the inflationary
impact of the deficit. Under Law 4357 of July 16, 1964 the government
was authorized to issue "Re-adjustable National Treasury Obligations"
(ORTN)—index-linked bonds. These bonds, of two-, three-, and five-
year maturities, were to be re-adjusted every three months according
to the wholesale price index compiled by the Fundaclo Getfilio Vargas,
an autonomous government institution responsible for a broad range of
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statistical services including various price and output indices and
the national accounts. Interest of six to seven per cent per year was
to be paid on the re-adjusted principals. Given the lag in data col-
lection and processing, the re-adjustment of the bonds to be made at
the beginning of each quarter was to be based on a three-month moving
average lagged three months. Thus, an adjustment at the beginning of
month t would be made according to the following formula: V represents
the value of the bond at the beginning of month t and I represents the
wholesale price index for month t, the new value of the bond would be
V
t
« y
L
^t-4 + ^-5 + ^-6
This formula was modified a number of times over the years following.
The bonds can never have been said to have provided a perfect inflation
correction, but at least until the mid-1970s they came as close as was
feasible: to all intents and purposes, the bonds provided a positive
and near-certain real rate of return. (See Table 2.) The government
was therefore able to market these bonds to the public to finance its
Q
deficit. (See Table 3.) By the early 1970s the deficit was eliminated,
but the ORTN continued to be issued to serve as assets for various insti-
tutions that used them to back their own index-linked liabilities. The
same law that instituted the ORTN also provided for index-linking of
tax debts in arrears, to stimulate prompt payment of taxes (previously
the penalty payment had been only one per cent per month on the unpaid
balance, so that it was profitable to evade tax payments for as long as
possible); and it also introduced index-linking of fixed corporate assets
-6-
for the purpose of calculating depreciation, so that firms' accounting
9
statements would yield more realistic profit figures.
It is important to understand both the background of sustained
inflation and the government's "gradualist" approach to controlling its
deficit and the inflation in order to understand the approach that the
government decided upon to resolve the national housing shortage. By
1964 the housing shortage had become critical: the filthy, disease-
ridden shanty towns that ringed Brazil's cities were growing inexorably,
and had even become internationally famous. The rapid industrialization
of the country had induced heavy migration into Brazil's cities: in
1960 Brazil's urban population was about 32 million, whereas in 1940
it had been only about 13 million. This migration entailed a vastly
,
increased demand for housing, but the inflation, in combination with the/
usury and rent-control lows intended in part to insist the inflation,,
served to discourage the finance and construction of new housing. Pri-
vate financial institutions could not legally pay savers sufficiently
high rates of interest to cover what their accounts lost in purchasing
power to monetary depreciation, and the same law prohibited their
receiving interest on mortgage loans sufficient to prevent their being
de-capitalized. The housing programt of the National Social Insurance
Institute (INPS) and the "Popular Hou.e Foundation," which had begun to
operate in the 1950s, had collapsed. By the early 1960s only a small
number of official and semi-official institutions^ among these the
Caixa Econdmicas Federals and Estadu.iis (the federal and state thrift
institutions), continued to provide housing credit. Even these institu-
tions had to ration and restrict their lending; hence access to mortgage
credit became a matter of privilege. The rent-control legislation,
which had a continuing history going back to 1946, aggravated the effect
of inflation on housing construction: although rent levels were permitted
to rise a number of times, they were never permitted to rise sufficiently,
and they made rental of residences a highly unprofitable and uncertain
business.
By early 1964 the Brazilian housing-finance market had virtually
ceased to exist. The rent-control law in effect was Law 4240 of June 28,
1963; a rent fixed under this law lost more than half its value by the
same date a year later. With inflation running at around 100 percent
per year, there were no savings available for housing: in March 1964
the Caixa Econ6mica Federal announced a "temporary suspension" of its
12
mortgage programs; and the statistical bulletin of the Getulio Vargas
Foundation, Conjuntura EconQmica , reported that in that month the
Rio de Janeiro real-estate market presented the lowest transaction volume
13
since the bulletin began to record its activity in 1947. The crisis
at least had the virtue of demonstrating that the housing situation had
to be reformed entirely, and that the rent-control and usury laws were
part of the problem, not the solution.
The Brazilian National-Housing Finance System: the problem of inflation
adjustment
.
Having introduced index-linked bonds in the public-finance sphere,
the government reasoned that the index-linking principle might also be
applied in the housing-finance sector. A law was drafted by the new
government and submitted to Congress for rapid debate: it was signed
as Law 4380 on August 30, 1964. The law instituted a National Housing
-8-
Plan, the name of which was later changed to the "Housing Finance
System" (SFH) . It provided for the chartering of private Real-Estate
Credit Societies, Savings-and-Loan Associations, housing cooperatives,
and other institutions which ware to serve as "financial agencies" of
the new system. A few years later the mortgage programs of the Caixas
Econdmicais were also brought into the new system. A new National
Housing Bank (BNH) was established as an autonomous federal institution:
this was to serve the SFH broadly in the way that a central bank serves
a commercial-banking system, acting as a central organ of finance, con-
trol, and day-to-day regulation of the system. At first the BNH was
financed by a one-per-cent payroll tax on all employees covered by the
labor legislation and a forced twenty-year (index-linked) loan of 4
percent of residential rents, levied on the landlords. Later on, as
we shall relate, the BN11 financing system was completely changed. Most
interesting for our present purposes, the law provided that contracts
for sale, construction, and mortgage of private houses could—but did
not have to—contain provisions to re-adjust amortization payments and
outstanding balances according to the national minimum wage—note, not
according to the government-bond index—sixty days after any date that
14
the minimum wage was changed. The Real-Estate Credit Societies and
the BNH were authorized to emit "Housing Bills," which could be index-
linked in the same way as the government's own ORTN. The law also
authorized the use of index-linked savings accounts.
The housing and construction markets were made more attractive to
firms and individuals through reforms in the old rent-control legislation.
-9-
Law 4494 of November 25, 1964 provided that all new rental leases would
be index-linked on an annual basis, while old rental leases would not be
index-linked but would be permitted to make an additional upward adjust-
ment each year so that eventually their real value would be brought up
to an appropriate level. This was part of the new government's policy
of permitting "corrective inflation," i.e., bringing certain prices that
had been regulated at artificially low levels by the previous government
16 '
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up into line with the current price level. Later, Decree-Law 322 of
'
'
'; Sfi " ! ;
April 4, 1967 limited. the indexation of rents originally contracted before
1964, but eliminated all controls on rental leases signed after the date
of the Decree-Law.
Between 1964 and early 1966 the new system remained bound up in
planning and organization. A staff of considerable technical capability
was assembled at the BM; headquarters in Rio de Jarieiro, A number of
issues had to be resolved. For one thing, it appeared that the agencies
of the SFH that were being established were not capable of providing
housing for the slum-dwellers (though it was recognized that by re-
lieving the middle-class housing market the pressure on the lower-class
housing market would be relieved). A partial solution to this problem
was attempted by authorizing the establishment of "Popular Cooperatives,"
as special agencies of the. system. Much of the new staff's energies
were directed to determining how. adjustment for inflation would operate
: in> the BNH. The debate was intense, and politically charged. (The
first president of the. BNH, Sandra Cavalcanti, resigned in 1965, claiming
that the SFH could not operate equitably with index-linking, although her
-10-
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resignation also had other political motives. A further problem of
the new system was that it remained under-capitalized for the scope of
the problem it was intended to solve.
The problems of what to do about inflation adjustment and of under-
capitalization were resolved during 1966. In January 1966 the BNH,
under its attribution of "orienting and controlling" the SFH, issued
its "Instruction No. 5." Instruction No. 5 provided that the agencies
of the SFH would not only index-link their assets and liabilities, but
would do all their accounting in real terms, through the institution
of the "Standard Capital Unit" (UPC) as the unit of account of the
system. The UPC was simply the current par value of government index-
19
linked bonds. (Under Decree-Law 70 of November 21, 1966, which also
authorized the establishment of Savings-and-Loan Associations, the UPC
was instituted with a separate legal basis--to Lc calculated in the same
way as the ORTN, but to continue as the unit of account of the SFH even
in the event that the ORTN were discontinued).
As we have seen, the legislation that established the SFH originally
provided that assets and liabilities would be adjusted according to the
minimum wage. There was an important problem with this, however. Begin-
ning in mid-1965 the government implemented an incomes policy to control
wages: in effect, all major categories of wages henceforth were to be set
once a year, each category in a particular month. The new wage level was
to be set in such a way that, on the basis of a government projection of
inflation for the coming year, the purchasing power of the wage for the
coining year would be equal to the average purchasing power of the wage
-11-
over the previous 24 months. The minimum wage was to be set each year in
20
May according to this policy. Mow clearly this meant that the minimum-
wage adjustment would not be sufficient to compensate for the previous
year's inflation. Between July 1964 and April 1966, the government-bond
index rose by 76 percent while the minimum wage rose by only 33 percent.
The government intended to continue this wage policy as part of its struggle
against inflation. This created a dilemma for the SFH. On the one hand,
if loans and obligations were adjusted according to the minimum wage, the
system's creditors would be inadequately protected against inflation and
the SFH would be de-capitalized; on the other hand, given that the minimum
wage was being repressed, it would have been unfair to ask mortgage-holders
of the income groups that the SFH aimed to serve to amortize their loans
according to the QRTN index. Instruction No. 5 resolved this problem in
the following way: all assets and liabilities oi the L.FH would be linked
to the ORTN index, and these included the outstanding balances of all mort-
gages. But the monthly payments of amortization and interest on the
mortgages could, if the mortgage-holder wished, be adjusted according to
„v • • 21the mxnimum wage.
This meant, in practice, that Instruction No. 5 allowed the mortgage-
22holder to elect one of two payments plans. ' Under both, the outstanding
balance of the mortgage was corrected every three months according to the
ORTN index. Under what was called "Plan A," however, the monthly payments
of amortization plus interest, calculated when the mortgage was drawn up
in current cruzeiros
,
were adjusted annually according to the minimum wage,
sixty days after the adjustment of the minimum wage. After 300 months,
-12-
if the mortgage were still not completely amortized, the monthly payments
would be corrected thereafter according to the ORTN index. Under what
was called "Plan B," the monthly payments of amortization and interest
were corrected from the start like the outstanding balance, every three
months according to the ORTN index. Under both plans, the monthly pay-
ments were determined initially in current cruzeiros according to the
"French" Amortization Plan, or Tabela "Price" as it is known in Brazil.
The French Amortization Plan determines the monthly payments of amortiza-
tion and interest for a given mortgage, interest, and term in such a way
that all the payments are equal. The Appendix describes the calculation
of the French Amortization Plan and Plan A in algebraic terms.
Since Instruction No. 5 altered the dispositions of Law 4380
regarding adjustment within the SFH for inflation, special legislation
had to be submitted to Congress to modify Law 4380. This legislation had
been drawn up and debated in Congress during 1965 and the early part of
1966. In the congressional debates important opposition to the index-
linking concept emerged, and the legislation was amended to authorize
the SFH to grant certain mortgages without fully index-linking their
outstanding balance. On the advice of his economic ministers, who were
keenly aware that the SFH could not operate fairly and rationally with
both nominal and index-linked finance, the President vetoed those por-
tions of the legislation permitting nominal mortgages. The legislation
authorizing Instruction No. 5 was signed as Law 5049 of June 29, 1966.
Congress actually over-rode the veto in August; again, on the advice
of his economic ministers, the President responded immediately with
-IV
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Decree-Law 19 of August 30, 1966. " This Decree-Law annulled all
the legislation that permitted any form of nominal finance within the
SFH, and legally established the provisions of Instruction No. 5 as
obligatory.
At about the same time, a radical change was made in the financing
system of the BNH. The BNK was considered under-capitalized for its
task, as we have noted; at the same time, the social-security and un-
employment-insurance schemes of the existing labor legislation were
regarded as unsatisfactory on various grounds. A single solution was
found for both problems: Law 5107 of September 13, 1966 created the
"Job-Tenure Guarantee Fund" (FGTS). The FGTS was to be financed by a
compulsory deposit made each month by all firms, in the amount of 8
percent of the total remuneration paid during the previous month to all
employees covered by the FGTS. The deposit was Lo be made to special
accounts associated with the name of each employee (and not with the
firm, as was the case under the previous labor laws). These accounts
were to be index—linked according to the ORTN and were to pay annual
interest 3 to 6 percent (this was later reduced to 3 percent for all
FGTS accounts). The employee, or his beneficiary, was to have access
to the account when he was dismissed without due cause for any reason
from his employment, or in the event of retirement, disability, or
death. In addition, even where an employee left his employment volun-
tarily, he was to have access to his account for a number of purposes-r-
for example, to capitalize his own enterprise, or, in the cas-e of a
woman, to get married. The FGTS was instituted without repealing the
-14-
old labor laws regarding indemnization of workers dismissed without just
cause. Under the old laws, the worker received indemnization only when
he was dismissed without just cause after at least one year in a given
employment. To this day workers may choose to remain under the old laws
or to enter the FGTS. A majority chose the FGTS at its inception, and
workers entering the labor force since 1966 have almost unanimously pre-
ferred the FGTS. Under Law 5107, the resources of the FGTS were to be
applied entirely in the BNB, thus making an enormous volume of savings
available to the SFH. The FGTS rapidly became the BNH's principal source
of funds, comprising more than three quarters of the BNH's total lia-
bill ties.
During 1966 the first Real-Estate Credit Societies began to operate
in Brazil's larger cities, and in 1967 the first Savings-and-Loan Associa-
tions were set up. During 1967 the SFH agencies beg;, n an expanded program
of mortgage credit. It is clear that the character of the real-estate
market changed radically during the first few months of the year. The
construction industry revived, with powerful direct and multiplier benefits
for national income and employment. In June 1967 a leader of the construc-
tion industry gave his opinion that "index-linking constitutes the greatest
conquest of the [1964] Revolution, (on account of its] permitting the
turn-over of resources dedicated to housing, through the maintenance of
25
their real value." Not everyone, however, was quite as pleased as this
with the operation of index-linking in the SFH. Indeed as large numbers of
people took on mortgages and saw how the mortgage-payments system operated,
criticisms and protests began to mount. It was particularly disconcerting
-15-
for mortgage-holders to discover that, after having made a monthly
payment or two, the nominal balance outstanding was higher than the
original nominal value of the mortgage. Many mortgage-holders could
understand neither the mechanism nor the rationale of the system, and
many had taken on mortgages beyond their means on the supposition that
inflation would erode the real outstanding balance as it always used
to. There were protests from labor unions, and also from sectors of
the military, who had had privileged access to what little mortgage
26
credit had been available in the early 1960s.
Part of the problem was that the BNK had done an exceedingly poor
27job of explaining the new system and its rationale to the public.
Public relations was a general failing of the technocratic policies that
had been instituted since 196A: precisely because the technocrats'
policies did not depend /or their institution on a political constituency,
they did not feel a strong compulsion to explain what they were doing to
the general public. But the payments plans of the mortgages, with their
outstanding balances index-linked and their amortizations adjusted ac-
cording to the minimum wage, did have a number of troubling properties.
Some of these were corrected early on, some only later. The first problem
was that the amortization of a mortgage might last much longer than ori-
ginally planned. The minimum wage was lagging well behind the ORTN index,
and thus the outstanding balance was corrected at a faster rate than the
monthly payments. It was widely feared that this meant that the out-
standing balance could grow indefinitely and the mortgage turn eternal
if the minimum wage continued to lag. These fears were certainly justified
-16-
in theory: as the Appendix shows, the outstanding balance could increase
in real terms , after a monthly payment was made, if the monthly payment
were insufficient to cover all of the real interest on the outstanding
balance for the month. The view of the BNH staff was that this was highly
unlikely to occur very often--over the long run, it was felt, the minimum
wage simply could not be allowed by the government to continue to lag r
behind the price level. The public did not maintain such confidence,
however.
The BNH made a first attempt to solve the problem through a
Resolution of its Council, RC 30 of August 23, 1967. This provided
that if any mortgage lasted fifty percent longer than its originally
contracted term the BNH would pay the balance to the financing entity.
A special fund was set up for this purpose in the BNH, called the Fund
for the Compensation of t'nge Variations (FCVS). It was financed by
collecting from each SFH mortgage holder an amount equal to his first
28
monthly payment at the time that that payment was made.
A further problem with the payments scheme was that the annual
increase in the monthly payments took place on July 1 of each year,
sixty days after the annual increase in the minimum wage, but many
mortgage-holders received the annual increase in their earnings at a
different time of the year. The BNH solved this problem in late 1967
by introducing a "Plan C." Plan C was the same as Plan A, except that
under a Plan C the mortgage-holder could decide at what month of the
29year his monthly payments would be adjusted.
The introduction of the FCVS and of Plan C did not entirely
resolve the problems of the mortgage-payments schemes. In the first
-17-
place much of the public still resented the escalation of outstanding
balances and monthly payments. True, it was no longer possible for a
mortgage to become eternal. Now, however, the fear was expressed that
the FCVS could go bankrupt: if the minimum wage continued to lag behind
the price index, the FCVS might accumulate more debt than it could pay
off. It seemed at least possible that a given mortgage could end up,
6ven after one-and-a-half times the originally specified term, wi, th an
outstanding balance greater in real terms than the original payment on
the mortgage to the FCVS. In this case the particular mortgage wouLd,
take more from the FCVS than it had put in.. This was perhaps not likely-
the technical staff of the BNH maintained a sanguine faith that the
minimum wage could not be allowed to decline very much longer in real
terms. After all there were national labor productivity gains, and con-
sumer demand could not lung withstand a declining real wage. But the
eventual bankruptcy of the FCVS was a theoretical possibility, and pro-
posals to change the system continued to be made. The introduction.,of
Plan C created a problem of its own. Under Plan C, a mortgage-holder
.
:,
could put off the increase in his monthly payment for as much as eleven
months after the time that it would have gone into effect under Plan A.,
By then inflation would have made this mortgage-holder's monthly payment
smaller in real terms than it would be if he had chosen an earlier month.
To respond to the growing criticism of the amortization plans, the
BNH announced a reform: through Resolution 36/69 of, the BNH Administra-
tive Council (November 1969), Plans A and C were replaced by a single
"Wage Equivalence Plan" (PFS), while Plan B was retained under the name
-18-
of "Index-linking Plan." Under the Wage-Equivalence Plan, the term of
each mortgage would be fixed definitively at the signing of the mortgage.
The initial contribution of one monthly payment to finance the FCVS was
eliminated, but the FCVS was retained: if the accumulated increase in
the minimum wage over the term of a particular mortgage were to turn out
less than the accumulated increase in the ORTN index, the FCVS would pay
what was still owed to the financing entity. On the other hand, however,
if the accumulated increase in the minimum wage were to turn out more
than the accumulated increase in the government-bond index, the mortgage-
holder would nevertheless continue to make adjusted monthly payments
until the end of the term originally specified. In this case, the mort-
gage-holder would pay more, in real terms, than he had borrowed; the
original loan would be completely amortized before the end of the term,
and after the point at which this happened the hid rtgaye-holder 's re-
maining payments would be paid into the FCVS. The PES also incorporated
a mechanism to solve the problem created by permitting monthly payments
to be adjusted at different times of the year. Henceforth, under the
PES the mortgage-holder could decide at what quarter (not month) his
monthly payments would be adjusted each year. A "Wage-Equalizing Co-
efficient" would be applied to the adjustment of the monthly payments:
this was a kind of fine-tuned correction determined by the BNH through
a complex formula—the longer the adjustment was put off after the
increase in the minimum wage, the higher would be the correction co-
30
efficient applied.
The PES was a peculiar reform. To many people it had the air of
a political confidence trick based on the fact that the public still
19-
uncerstood so little of the technical intricacy of index-linking.
Inceed, it is clear that the reform was designed for the maximum
psychological effect, to avoid having to make a more drastic reform.
One of the most important changes made under the PES was that mortgage-
holders were simply no longer told what their outstanding balance was
after they made their monthly payments. They did not need to know any-
more, the BNH argued: the monthly payments were simply made as before,
until the term was up. Only if a mortgage-holder wished to pay off his
mortgage before its term was up would he be told its current outstanding
balance. It is clear that the average Brazilian mortgage-holder tended
to evaluate his situation by comparing his mortgage payments to what he
would pay if he were renting a home, bearing in mind that mortgage
parents would eventually come to an end and he would own his home; con-
sequently the PES confo.ne'd father sensitively u. the psychology of the
Brazilian mortgage-holder. A few months after the reform was announced,
Co ijuntura Economica offered the view that "it would surely be an
exaggeration to claim that the essence of the Wage-Equivalence Plan was
a ihange of name, but one must not under-estimate the importance of the
31psychological escape valve..." ' By establishing that the term of all
SFH mortgages would henceforth be specified at the time they were signed,
the BNH removed at a stroke the uncertainty attaching to the term of the
mortgages, and the resentment that this entailed. But—curiously for a
reform designed by proponents of index-linking—it accomplished this by
turning the real amount to be paid by an SFH mortgage-holder uncertain,
and quite likely to turn out greater or smaller than the original loan.
-20-
Only if the mortgage-holder selected the "Index-linking Plan" would he
be certain that he would pay back in real terms exactly the same amount
that he had borrowed. But this plan was simply too risky for many mort-
gage-holders. A Gallup poll in 1969 confirmed that most Brazilians still
believed that the growth of the minimum wage would continue to lag behind
that of the price level. It had lagged behind since 1962. The BNH
reasoned that eventually the growth of labor productivity must pull it
up—hence, as Conjuntura Economica put it, "there is no reason whatever
32for a priori fears for the fate of the [FCVS]." The public pessimism
revealed by the Gallup poll was probably based not only on the previous
eight years' experience, but also on the view that the government was
generally regarded as pro-business; that there was considerable leeway
within which the government could set the minimum wage; and that it would
probably continue Lo be . ct with a view tu conLiulliug inflationary cost
pressures. The Brazilian economy was growing rapidly, but so was the
number of new entrants into the labor force; hence new entrants could be
compelled to accept a low wage, while older members of the labor force
could move on to nigher-paying jobs.
By the end of the 1960s, then, the SFH was operating with a peculiar
mortgage-payments system that did not quite work according to the index-
linking principle. Given die government's wage policy, the PES was argu-
ably the best compromise possible. It conformed to the Brazilian mortgage-
holder's psychology remarkably well, and it seems to have reduced the
public complaints quite dramatically. It placed the SFH as a whole in a
somewhat precarious position, at least theoretically, because the BNH's
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obligations
—
particularly the FGTS—were index-linked according to the
ORTN index. It is possible that this meant that the SFH could not provide
as much subsidized, low-income housing as it should have, because the
real interest rates for low-income programs were lower than those for
programs serving the middle classes. During the 1970s the decline in
the real value of the minimum wage was arrested, and the real minimum
wage appears to have been roughly stabilized. This relieved the mortgage-
payments problem considerably, and as we shall relate the SFH found it
possible to reduce the cost of mortgage finance.
In the late 1960s the SFH began an active program of index-linked
passbook savings. This has proven to be the most successful application
of the index-linking principle in Brazil; indeed, there are grounds for
believing that after 1974 the passbook-savings program proved too successful
3'!
from the point of view Oj. the Brazilian economy uei a V/hole. Index-linked
passbook savings accounts were made available at the private agencies of
the SFH, particularly), the Real-Estate Credit Societies, the Savings-and-Loan
Associations, and the federal and state Caixas Econdmicas , and they carry
a government guarantee up to a limit which is itself index-linked. Their
growth to date has been extraordinary, and they have apparently had some
success in attracting savings from relatively poorer people. The larger
financial institutions outside the SFH have also incorporated passbook-
savings programs into their operations, although only the agencies of the
SFH work exclusively with index-linked liabilities. The passbook savings
accounts generally pay about 6 percent interest per year, with quarterly
index-linking calculated on the smallest of three balances on the first
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day of each of the three months of the previous quarter. There is
generally a period of six months after a new account is opened before
interest and index-linking is credited to the account. Until 1974
deposits made up to the fifteenth of each month were considered to
have been made on the first of the month, and deposits made after the
fifteenth were considered to have been made on the first day of the
next month, for purposes of calculating interest and index-linking.
After November 1974 the grace period was reduced from fifteen to five
days. The SFH agencies continued to issue index-linked housing bonds,
though during the 1970s the public has come to prefer the liquidity
34
of the passbook savings. By the start of the present decade, the
mechanisms of inflation adjustment within the SFH were pretty much
settled. The liabilities of the SFH—the FGTS, the housing bonds is-
sued by the privale agencies of the SFH, and the passouok savings
accounts—were all index-linked according to the ORTN index. The
mortgage-payments of the system were all adjusted according to the
PES, save for the small proportion of mortgages that were completely
index-linked. The accounting of the SFH was done in terms of the
UPC, a unit that was linked to the ORTN index. Tne passbook-savings
accounts were extremely popular, and they grew through the 1970s; in
addition the FGTS accounts were index-linked. Broadly speaking, then,
the index-linked liabilities of the SFH, which were essentially public
assets, were accepted and popular. The mortgages were far less popular,
although the institution of the PES had clearly improved their public
acceptance. Nevertheless complaints about the mortgages continued.
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In an interview with this writer, Dr. Rubens Vaz da Costa, who served
as president of the BNH from 1971 to 1974, reported that the mortgage-
35
payments scheme was his most persistent public-relations problem.
Those few people who had access to mortgage credit before 1964 naturally
found the SFH payments system dis-advantageous when compared with the
earlier nominal mortgage scheme; that was only understandable. But
there were other people who still found the escalating monthly payments
perplexing and expensive. It was clear that too many people were taking
on mortgage obligations beyond their means, and the BNH struggled against
this problem with great difficulty. On certain occasions mortgage-
holders who were having problems meeting their payments were permitted
to change their mortgages.
Around 1970 the SFH found that, with funds coming in from the FGTS
and the passbook saving, accounts, (.he liabilities of the system were
growing faster than the assets. The BNH concluded that it was in a
position to make mortgage terms more attractive, and throughout the 1970s
it took various steps to reduce the cost of mortgages. At the same time,
as the,.real. minimum wage stabilized and it came to seem possible that
it would even, rise, the problems associated with the PES took on a dif-
ferent character. If the real minimum wage really did begin to rise,
mortgages would be amortized unnecessarily rapidly.
A number of measures were taken to meet these problems. Law 5705
of September 21, 1971 provided for reduced mortgage rates and lengthened
terms. Decree-Law 1188 of the same date provided a fiscal incentive: 20
percent of the monthly payments made during a given year could henceforth
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be deducted from personal income taxes. This measure affected a
relatively small part of the Brazilian public, since only a small per-
centage of Brazil's population falls into income brackets sufficiently
high to incur income tax. Following these changes, the BNH decided to
make a change that ran somewhat in the opposite direction: it replaced
the Tabela "Price " with a "System of Constant Amortizations" (SAC) as
the means of calculating the monthly payments to be made on mortgages.
Henceforth, the monthly amortizations made in each month were to be equal,
and the monthly payments would consist of the amortization and the
interest on the (index-linked) outstanding balance. The monthly payments
would be calculated at the signing of the mortgage, and then adjusted
according to the PES. Under the SAC, the first monthly payments (in real
terms) would be higher, and then decline over the term of the mortgage,
rather than remain cons nt. This would seem a ..:£rt.;,ive change, since
the real monthly payments under the SAC would fall while an average
family's real income would rise. It was justified on two grounds. The
first was that the real-estate market would respond to the relaxation
of mortgage rates and terms made the previous month by raising the
price of real estate; increasing the initial mortgage payments, it was
hoped, would tend to offset this. The second was that Brazilians had
always been accustomed to falling real monthly payments on their raort-
37gages, and the SAC was more in keeping with this.
Further reductions in the SFH rates were effected during 1972.
This was part of a general government effort to reduce interest rates
in all of Brazil's financial sector. Resolution 235 of the National
Monetary Council (the nation's monetary authority, under the chairman-
ship of the Finance Minister) of September 14, 1972 provided for a
general reduction of the rates of interest on liabilities and assets of
the SFH. In addition, the same Resolution provided that no scheme of
inflation adjustment could exceed the adjustment of the ORTN. In the
SFH this effectively meant that if the minimum wage rose by more than
the accumulated adjustment of the ORTN over the preceding year, the
ORTN adjustment would be used to adjust the monthly payments. Conse-
quently, monthly payments could not rise by more than the ORTN index.
Finally, the same Resolution provided that interest rates must all be
expressed in annual terms, not quarterly terms. This in itself effec-
tively lowered interest rates that had previously been expressed in
quarterly terms and had been compounded quarterly. After December
1972, index-linking on lVi'S accounts was to be applied annually, not
quarterly as previously.
In 1974 the government extended the benefits of the fiscal incentive
provided in 1971 to all mortgage-holders, not merely those who paid income
tax. Decree-Law 1358 of November 12, 1974 eliminated the 1971 fiscal
benefit, and replaced it with credit certificates to be given to all mort-
gage-holders in the value of 10 percent of the monthly payments that had
been paid during the previous year. Decree-Law 1431 of December 5, 1975
increased the percentage to 12 percent, and also raised the minimum and
39maximum amounts that could be so credited under the previous law.
A number of other changes were made in the operations of the SFH
throughout the 1970s, but these are outside the scope of the present
essay, which is the method of adjusting for inflation employed by the
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SFH. We should note, however, chat in 1975 and 1976 substantial changes
were made in the way the the ORTN adjustments are made, as part of a
broader government objective to reduce the attractiveness of index-linked
40
assets vis-a-vis nominal assets. In August 1975 the government announced
that henceforth the adjustment could be reduced, if the increase in the
price index was due, in the view of the government, to "accidental" fac-
tors, such as the agricultural disasters that plagued Brazil during 1975.
In May 1976 a more drastic change was made: henceforth the ORTN adjustment
would be made according to the formula
.8 • p + .2 • 15%
(in annual terms), where p is the adjustment that would have been made
under the previous formula. It was hoped that in this way the "inflation-
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feedback." effect of inde;..-linking on the economy woula De weakened.
Conclusions .
What lessons can be drawn from the institution of adjustment for
inflation in the Brazilian Housing-Finance System? Some of our conclusions
seem rather obvious a priori . One hardly needs to refer to the Brazilian
experience to be convinced that in an inflationary context people are
pleased enough to hold index-linked assets but would rather not undertake
index-linked obligations. Thus it is not surprising that the Brazilian
public accepted the index-linked social insurance fund quite happily, and
demonstrated considerable enthusiasm for Index-linked housing bonds and
passbook savings; nor la it surprising that the mortgage-payments schemes
generated controversy and protest.
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What is perhaps most interesting about the experience of the SFH is
the dilemma that the BNH staff faced in 1966 when it drew up Instruction
No. 5. The BNH staff reasoned, correctly, that it would be impossible to
finance a nation-wide mortgage program unless the SFH guaranteed its
liabilities against the (unpredictable) erosion of their value through
inflation. In other words, long-term liabilities would not be subscribed
in terms of a depreciating monetary unit. Thus the BNH staff proposed
that the SFH employ a unit of account that maintained its purchasing-
power value, the UPC. The problem—and this is the heart of the index-
linking dilemma—was that liabilities in terms of the UPC must be backed
by assets denominated in the same unit of account. These assets, however,
would be liabilities of the public. Given that the national monetary
unit was still the cruzeiro , it was impossible for the public to back
its UPC liabilities with UPC assets, for the assets oi the public must,
perforce, be largely in terms of the monetary unit. In particular, wage
contracts under the Brazilian incomes policy were still denominated in
terms of the cruzeiro . Thus the BNH staff had to struggle to make the
mortgage-payments scheme compatible, on the one hand, with the UPC lia-
bilities of the SFH and, on the other hand, with the cruzeiro assets of
the public.
The solutions that the BNH staff reached, in Instruction No. 5 and
in the PES, must be regarded as ingenious, even if imperfect, considering
the nature of the problem that they were up against. It has manifestly
proved successful, at least to the extent that the SFH has grown and
expanded its programs. It is clear that the SFH has not been able to
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provide as much low-cost housing for persons of lower-income classes as
it ought to have on grounds of social criteria: Brazil's larger cities
still have too much sub-standard housing. But the SFH has financed a
large amount of new housing construction; and even if it is true that
the direct beneficiaries of this were middle class, the housing market
as a whole was considerably eased. Moreover, since 1968 the BNH has
provided credit to municipalities for construction of urban infrastruc-
ture. The value that this has had for Brazil's urban development cannot
be over-estimated.
All the same, to return to our theme, the Brazilian public has
clearly not liked index-linking, and it is likely that if it had been
able to choose it would have preferred to do without it altogether.
But given the inflationary circumstances, it was probably the only
viable solution for the national housing shortage, anu it wai> probably
the only means by which savings could be accumulated. It was precisely
for situations like this that the military felt that they had to retain
power: there were too many Brazilian problems of this kind that re-
quired unpopular, long-term solutions, solutions that a more democratic
regime could not provide.
One final observation. We have considered the SFH and its problem
of adjusting to an inflationary context from a rather limited perspective,
and this has kept certain other issues off the stage. We have observed
that the particularly remarkable achievement of the BNH staff was that
it managed to solve the problem instituting a constant-purchasing-power
unit of account in an economy that has continued to use a depreciating
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monetary unit as its unit of account. The rest of Brazil's financial
system, apart from the federal Treasury (which is a special case, since
obviously a government that can compel the creation of new money need
not worry in the same way as private firms about the backing of its own
obligations), has not been able to resolve this dilemma. Brazil's
industrial and commercial finance continues to be denominated in the
monetary unit. Now this has placed the SFH in a peculiar position.
Since its liabilities are index-linked, its competitive position in the
market for investable funds is exceedingly strong. Indeed, ironically,
its position is the stronger, the higher and the more uncertain is the
rate of inflation. This writer has argued in separate works that the
competitive pressure of the availability of index-linked assets has
had severe effects on other financial institutions
—
particularly Brazil's
investment banks, t>toek markets, non-bank financial uu<_ermediaries f
and commercial banks. In situations of rising inflation, such as have
occurred in recent years in Brazil, this pressure has caused severe
problems for Brazil's financial system. In evaluating the success
of the modes of inflation-adjustment employed by Brazil's SFH, these
problems should not be ignored, even though they are beyond the limited
scope of the present essay.
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Appendix
1. Without index-linking, the French Amortization Plan operates
as follows. Given a mortgage of S
n
, a monthly rate of interest
r, and the number n of monthly payments to be made, the size of
each monthly payment 1' is given by
P = rU±ElL. s (1)
(l+r)
n
-l
°
This formula is derived as follows. Let I be the interest payment
to be made at time t, A the amortization to be made at time t, and
S the outstanding balance after the payment at time t. The point
of the plan is that for all t
P = A +1 = constant. (2)
By definition,
s
t
= s
t-i - V (3)
the interest payment is calculated as
h - rSt-r < 4 >
Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) gives
S
t-1 "
b
t
+ rS
t-l "
P
'
or Y = (l+r)S
t_ 1
- Sf
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Hence S
x
= (l+r)S
Q
- P,
S
2
« (l+r)S
1
- P
= (l+r)
2
SQ
- (l+r)P - P,
t-1
S„ = (l+r)X - P 3E (1+r) c . (5)
CT
Since s
n
= o,
n-1
= (l+r) nS - P X
t=0
and
P . W* s .
n-1
I d+rr
t=0
n-1 . n-1
1
Now Z (l+r) C = (l+r)
"1
E [T^-]
t
t=0 t=0
l-(—
)
n
- (l+r)-1 [—i^-]
(l+r) n-l
Therefore
p= _ril±r^ Q<E#D<
<l+r)-l U
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2. Plan A may be described as follows. Let p represent the ORTN price
index at time t; w the minimum wage at time t; P the nominal monthly
payment at time t; P the monthly payment calculated at the signing of the
mortgage, through the French Amortization Plan; S the nominal balance
after the monthly payment has been made; A the nominal amortization pay-
ment . Then
W
t
t v
p w
and S = — S^ . (1+r) - P —
.
t P t-1 w
3. The operation of Plan A may be described simply as follows. Let P
represent the nominal monthly payment of amortization and interest calcu-
lated according to the French Amortization Plan at t 0, the time when
the mortgage is signed. Let P represent the nominal monthly payment
that will actually be pi d at time t, S the noi. :i rial outstanding
wage at time t, p the ORTN index at time t, and r the monthly interest
rate. Then
W
t
P = P " —
,
(6)
t w
Q
and then the new outstanding balance is given by
P
t
s
t "
<1+r
> TQ s c-i " p t
- d+r) ^ S - P - i . (7)p
i.e., the new nominal outstanding balance is given by the old balance,
escalated by the ORTN index, multiplied by one plus the interest rate,
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minus the monthly payment. It is clear that S may exceed S
,
; it
will if
Pt
«
p
4. Not only might the nominal value of S exceed that of S
,J the
real outstanding balance may increase after a monthly payment has been
V
made. The real values of S and S„ , at time t are given by S^ — and
: t-1 ° t p.
p C
S ," (using the ORTN ind.jx as the deflator)
.
P t >;-:':>
P P P
S r «** - (1+r) S„ | — - P- —t Pt t-1 pt t p t
p w
t'
p
= (1+r) S^
,
— - P ——
-
t"Lp
t
w p t
p
o
p
o
P Wt po
S„ — - S„ . — = [(1+r) - L] S^ . — - P -£— .tp t-lp -,„
:
t-1 p w p
Consequently the real outstanding balance will increase if
w
t p pP--FrSf . -- , (9)w P t t-1 Pj.
i.e., if the real monthly payment is insufficient to cover the real
interest on the previous real outstanding balance.
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NOTES
See Skidmore (1967) pp. 253-330, for a history of the events
leading up to the overthrow of the Goulart government and the assumption
of power by the Castello Branco government.
2
On the reasons for the Brazilian inflation of the early 1960s,
see Baer (1965).
3Calculated from the table "Indice geral de precos", in the
periodical Conjuntura Econ6mica , April 1977, p. 92.
See Skidmore (1967), pp. 234-259 for a discussion of the Dantas-
Furtado Program and its historical context.
See Conjuntura Econ6mica , May 1964, pp. 15-17; also Baer,
Kerstenetzky, and Siraonsen (1965).
See Kafka (1967), and Simonsen (1970), esp. pp. 23-40.
For the history of the ORTN adjustment formulas, see Conjuntura
Economica , "Correc,3o moneta'ria e realimentacSo inflacioniria," June 1976,
pp. 88-94.
8
See Chacel, Simonsen, and Wald (1970), pp. 111-113, and Baer and
Beckerman (1974).
9See Baer and Simonsen (1965), Chacel, Simonsen, and Wald (1970),
pp. 99-107, and Baer and Beckerman (1974).
Kampel and Miranda do Valle (1974), p. 9.
See Chacel, Simonsen, and Wald (1970), pp. 39-42. The very weak-
ness of the housing-finance market may have prevented an inflationary
demand for loans to build inflation-res istent luxury housing.
12
Conjuntura Econ3mica , July 1964, pp. 49-52.
13
Conjuntura Econ6mica
,
July 1964, p. 49. The political crisis
of March 1964 was probably also an important factor.
14
The provisions of Law 4380 are summarized in Chacel, Simonsen,
and Wald (1970), pp. 123-124. See also Kampel and Miranda do Valle (1974).
See Kampel and Miranda, pp. 147-148.
16
See Ellis (1969).
17
See Simonsen (1975), 66-67.
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18
In 1969, Sandra Cavalcanti discussed her views on the use of index-
linking in the SFH in a newspaper interview. She felt that the SFH could
not sustain its system of inflation adjustment, and she believed that the
public complaints that arose against index-linking during the late 1960s
provedr her point. "What the Ministry of Planning failed to remember when
it decided to institute the index-linking system within the BNH is that
economics is not mathematics. Economics is people, unemployment, disaster,
something human that a computer cannot resolve," she said. During 1965,
she noted, in the limited operations that the BNH was then carrying out,
a system of "inflation compensation" was employed: "the re-adjustment of
the value of the amortization was in relation to current money and the
amortization was calculated as 25 percent of the [mortgage-holder's]
salary. And the purchasers [of homes] had, in this form, conditions to
continue paying." She recommended that the SFH interest rates and the
index-linking be modified, and perhaps subsidized through some economic
activity of the state. Jornal do Brasil of Rio de Janeiro, "BNH d'efende
a correcao monetfiria e culpa a semantics, " November 3, 1969, pp. 28—29.19 ' " '
"
'
;
'
The provisions of Instruction No. 5 were explained to this writer
by Dr. Jos6 Eduardo Oliveira Penna, the director of the BNH from December
1965 to March 1974, in several interviews granted in November 1976 and
May 1977.
"'20
See Fishow (1974), pp. 267-268. The wage policy is discussed
.throughout Simonsen (1970); the rationale of the policy is discussed on
pp. 26-28.
21
As explained to this writer by Dr. Jose1 Eduardo Oliveira Penna.
See also Cortjuntura EconQmica , "0 Piano de Equivalgncia Salarial e a
correqSo monetaria," March 1970, pp. 65-67.
22
As long as the mortgage was below a certain ceiling; above that
ceiling Plan B had to be used. Also, in practice, SFH agencies "strongly
suggested" one plan or the other for particular mortgages.
i 23
The "Decree-Law" is a legislative device used in Brazil and a
number of other Latin-American nations. A presidential decree is issued,
establishing immediately as law a disposition that would otherwise require
congressional approval. The congress may then approve or disapprove the
disposition: If it disapproves, the disposition ceases to be effective.
In Brazii, the "Institutional Act No. 2" of 1965 (one of a series of
extra-constitutional changes promulgated by the post-1964 governments)
re-organized Brazil's political parties into a "government" party and
an "opposition" party. The government party, as part of its "party
discipline," is required to vote in Congress in favor of any Decree-Law.
Since the government party has had a congressional majority since 1965,
the Brazilian president has effectively held legislative powers since
then.
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24
See Kampel and Miranda do Valle, pp. 41-47; also Conjuntura
EconOmica , '"Editorial, * Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Serviqo,"
October 1966, pp. 9-11.
25
From a speech by Moacir Gomes de Almeida, an important construc-
tion entrepreneur and a member of the Sindicato de ConstruqSo Civil, a
trade association of construction firms. Quoted by the Folha de S5o Paulo,
June 1967.
The debate is briefly mentioned in Kampel and Miranda do Valle,
pp. 66-67, and in Conjuntura Econo'mica , "Mercado imobili^rio—em discusslo
a correqao monet£ria," September 1968. Dr. Jose" Eduardo Oliveira Penna
told this writer that he spent a large amount of his time between 1967 and
1969 responding to the public protests about the mortgage-payments systems.
Dr. Oliveira Penna believed that the protests came principally from func-
tionaries of the federal and state Caixas Econo'micas who were used to
working with nominal mortgages; from public servants and members of the
armed forces who had had privileged access to mortgage credit before 1964;
and from persons who had taken on excessive mortgage burdens. At one point,
in 1968, Dr. Oliveira Penna offered to permit persons who wished to change
the terms of their mortgage to do so. Dr. Oliveira Penna kindly showed
this writer a file of documents that he maintained from the period. These
include a memorandum by General Gerson de Pina, who was particularly active
in the opposition to the mortgage-payments system; General Gerson de Pina
made it clear that he did not oppose the index-linking principle, only
that he was contrary to the precise way that the SFH had applied it, par-
ticularly where "those wuo live solely on wages and pensions" are concerned.
He also suggested that the monthly payment never be permitted to exceed
30 percent of the mortgage-holder's income. "Some means must be found,"
he added, "to humanize the evolution of the outstanding balance, to stimu-
late the borrower to amortize the loan in the shortest possible term."
Another document was a memorandum from an adviser to the national railway
system's "Department of Assistance to the Railway Worker." This memorandum
complained that the existing housing program of this department could not
be modified to conform with the SFH system. The file also included a
mathematical analysis by an actuary, showing that mortgages under Plan A
could turn eternal (on grounds similar to those given in the Appendix to
the present essay). Finally, the file includes various statements pre-
pared by BNH officials in support of the index-linking principle and the
mortgage-payments scheme. In an inflationary context, these argue, there
is no other means to ensure the continued availability of funds for mort-
gage finance.
The public dissatisfaction with index-linking—in spite of the
degree to which the public received Index-linking through the FGTS and
the passbook-savings accounts introduced in 1968—was considerable. The
daily Jornal do Brasil of Rio de Janeiro published an opinion poll on
September 9, 1969, p. 48. The public's response to the question, "In
your opinion, index-linking ought to be ?" was as follows:
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reduced, 36 per cent; increased 4 per cent; left unchanged, 10 per cent,
abolished, 36 per cent. The remaining 14 per cent had no opinion or did
not know.
The Jornal do Brasil described the situations of three mortgage-
holders in a feature article later that year. One was an engineer who
had undertaken a mortgage with full index-linking (Plan B). His salary
did not keep. pace with the ORTN index, and he was now paying half his
salary to cover his mortgage. Another was finding it so difficult to
meet. his payments that he was thinking of selling back his home to get
out from under index-linking. A third, a poorer man, seems not to have
understood that his mortgage was index-linked in any sense—apparently
he had never heard of index-linking—but seemed to feel that his mort-
gage was a good enough deal. Jornal do Brasil , "BNH defende a correcSo
monetaria e culpa a semantica," November 3, 1969, p. 28.
27
This was recognized by the BNH staff. Dr. Jose" Eduardo
Oliveira Penna wrote a brief monograph in August 1968 entitled "Seven
Errors and One Truth," in which he listed seven common mis-conceptions
maintained by the public regarding the SFH mortgage-payments schemes
and refuted them. These mis-conceptions were that the mortgage could
become eternal; that the adjustments of the monthly payments would lag
forever behind the adjustment of the ORTN; that the outstanding balance
rose in real terms; that the rates were impossible to understand and
arbitrary; that the monthly payment rose faster than the mortgage-
holder's wage packet; that the mortgage-holder did not know what his
mortgage would finally cost him; and that the government was profiting
illicitly from index-linking. The monograph then noted as the one
truth that the plans had indeed been poorly explained to the public.
Characteristically, the monograph received limited circulation.
In an interview in 1969 with a reporter from the daily Jornal do
Brasil of Rio de Janeiro, officials of the BNH suggested that the
essence of the public-relations problem was psychological or semantic.
"Perhaps we ought to call ... the index-linking of debts and monthly
payments determination of their current value ("atualizacao de valor" )
.
"The long-term tendencies of wages is to grow in real terms. Only
those who do not believe in the country and do not believe in the pos-
sibilities and capacity of the Brazilian believes otherwise." Jornal
do Brasil
, "BNH defende a correcao monetaria e culpa semantica,"
November 3, 1969.
28
See the Conjuntura EconSmica article cited in Note 21. Dr.
Oliveira Penna explained this to the writer.
29
Ibid.
Ibid.
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31Conjuntura Economica , article cited in Note 20, p. 67. The
reform was also discussed at the time by the newsweekly magazine Veja
,
which is a Brazilian equivalent of the united States' Time or Newsweek .
Veja 's article included the following observations. "The expression
'index-linking' has become damned [in the mind of the public]; the people
are afraid to purchase houses and are afraid that they will not be able
to meet their monthly payments." Hence, the article continues, a "psy-
chological solution" has been presented through the adaption of the PES.
But [the PES] is not all illusion, since through the new plans, the
purchaser [of a home] receives a large gift: he will be able to conclude
the payment of his home." "Behind the decision lies the conviction that
the country will manage to overcome inflation in the short run and thus
that index-linking will end at once." The Brazilian press, as these
excerpts from Veja ' s contemporary coverage illustrate, was generally
hostile to the index-linking concept, and was not really very helpful
in explaining the idea to the public. Quotations from "HabitacHo:
Uma correcao psicol6gica," Veja , September 26, 1969, p. 32.
32Conjuntura Economica, article cited in Note 21, p. 66.
33
See Beckerman, "The Trouble . . ." (1978).
34
On the resources of the SFH, see Conjuntura Econ6mica , "0
Sistema Brasileiro de Poupanca e Eraprestimo," March 1974, pp. 65-70.
This article is part of an "Estudo Especial" of Conjuntura Econdmica
on the SFH, March 1974, pp. 45-117.
35
Interview with Dr. Rubens Vaz da Costa on September 28, 1976.
See Conjuntura Econdmica
,
"Sistema Financeiro Habitacional-
Recursos superam aplicacoes," September 1972, pp. 86-89, p. 86.
37
See Conjuntura Economica
,
"Tabela Price e o sistema financeiro
habitacional," January 1972, pp. 55-58. The writer learned the principal
justifications for the adoption of the SAC in an interview with Dr. Jose1
Roberto Rego Monteiro, the BNH staff-member who was the principal advocate
of the change, December 3, 1976.
38
See Conjuntura Economica
,
"Sistema Financeiro Habitacional-
crescimento tranqliilo," February 1973, pp. 94-100, p. 95.
39
See Conjuntura Economica , "Sistema Financeiro Habitacional-
ferte expansao no ano,' February 1976, pp. 165-174, p. 174.
40
See Conjuntura Econdtuica , Inflacao, correcao monetSria,
e indices de precos," September i975, pp. 91-94, esp. pp. 93-94.
41
See Banco Central do Brasil, Relat6rio 1976
,
p. 137.
42
See Beckerman, "The Trouble ..." (1978), and Beckerman, "Index-
linked Financial Assets ..." (1978).
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The Interpretation of Table 2b: The value of the index-linked bonds has
been determined each month by adjusting the previous month's value according
to the wholesale price index lagged several months, using the following
formula:
* ^ \-5 + h-6 + h-7 '
where V is the value of the bond at time t and I is the wholesale
price Index. (Originally the index-linked bonds were adjusted every three
months, according to the formula:
v = V -^ ^ ^ )
t t-1 I + I + IZ L V7 Xt-8 Lt-9 "
The prir.cipal changes made in the calculation of the bond values were these:
in 1969 a new wholesale price index was used, removing the wholesale prices
of goodiJ for export. In 1972 and 1973 a complicated formula was employed,
weighting the above formula by 60 percent and making the remaining 40 percent
of the formula depend on the government's target for inflation over the
coming period. During 1974 the previous formula was adopted again. In
August 1975 the wholesale price Index was "purged" of price increases deemed
to have been the consequence of the agricultural failures that occurred
around that time, for purposes of calculating the bond readjustment. After
April 1976 the adjustment formula became (approximately):
I + I + I —
V = 0.8 V
'- 2 ^ ^ + 0.2V (1.15) 12 .
If the bonds were perfect hedges against inflation, the correction formula
would 3e
:
Iv = v . - . (§)
t t-1 I K '
The first ::igure given for each month in Table 2Lb is the value:
--
„
X
June 1964
v = V . .
t-1
If the formula (§) had actually been used to adjust the bonds beginning
in August :L964, this first figure would be 10.00. To the extent that our
calculated figure falls short from 10.00, therefore, the bonds have failed
to incorporate the full inflation (measured by the v;holesale price index)
that occurred since July 1964. To determine the real rate of return (net
of interes :) on a bond held between times t and t, . calculate
...-•' o I s
V - V
.
H ^ .
\
o
At least between 1965 and 1974, our table shows that index-linked bonds
have pretty much retained their value. Between any given dates, however,
the bonds do clearly have real gains or losses. The second figure given
for each month shows the value
« „
T
June 1964
**
-v
-^r
-
.-'
where G i:> the general price index.
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